SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND FEAR IN GUATEMALA: ENDURING TIES AND LASTING CONSEQUENCES*

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ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the long-term ties between security, development, and fear in Guatemala. I argue that as the development apparatus in Guatemala has long been structured around violence and security concerns, development encounters in the contemporary era continue to be shaped by fear. The confluence of multiple mechanisms of fear, including the legacies of violence, surveillance, and coercion, structure development encounters in profound ways. Drawing on semistructured interviews with development practitioners, I examine their perceptions of fear's impact on development encounters at the local level to highlight the problematic culture of fear rhetoric, which serves to obscure practices through which lived experiences of fear are reproduced. Emphases on social cohesion, solidarity, and behaviors which "better contribute" to development work to mask the racialized elements of these discourses and ultimately serve to silence and delegitimize indigenous demands for structural change and justice in the country *Keywords: development, fear, Guatemala, security.*

*I*n June, 2017, the U.S. and Mexican governments co-hosted the "Conference for Prosperity and Security in Central America" in Miami, Florida. Bringing together government and business leaders, the conference bore the tagline "their success is our security," highlighting a well-worn, albeit problematic, relational view of development and security. As then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson argued, "Without security, it is impossible to have the stability that is conducive to robust economic development" (2017). And as Vice President Mike Pence noted, describing President Donald Trump's position on such matters, "In a word, we're in this together. As the President has said often, his highest duty as President of the United States is to keep America safe. But this President knows that your security and your prosperity are directly connected to ours" (2017). Conference contributors presented increased private investment as the primary driver for ensuring this prosperous development. And, lest anyone be confused about the type of security envisioned, the second day of the conference was held at the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) military headquarters.

This privileging of security in the Global North, along with emphases on neoliberal economic growth and militarized security, is not new. Rather, it is the extraordinary sameness that is remarkable. The United States' recent interest in Central America was sparked by the media-labeled "child migration crisis" of the summer of 2014, during which approximately 68,000

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unaccompanied migrant children were apprehended crossing the U.S. border (Swanson and Torres 2016). Efforts to spur regional development and increase security were seen as a way to quell migration from the region. This was a newer variant of what many have referred to as the security-development nexus. A pervading sense of fear throughout the Global North—characteristic of the post-9/11 war on terror—has motivated increasingly interventionist efforts to ostensibly improve livelihoods at the local level in the Global South (Abrahamson 2005; Duffield 2005; Stern and Öjendal 2010; O'Gorman 2011).

Proponents argue development and aid efforts aimed at improving liveli-hoods are vital mechanisms for quelling insecurity and conflict. Without such efforts, conflicts could arise and "spill over" from the Global South to impact other areas of the world. However, critics note this merger of development and security prioritizes Western security and fears, at the expense of attention towards fear elsewhere (Abrahamson 2005; Duffield 2005). Further, critical devel-opment scholars question the presupposed benevolence of "development," high-lighting instead how insecurity, violence, and fear (rather than improved livelihoods) are often provoked by its projects and processes (Escobar 2004; Oslender 2007). To elucidate these dynamics, in this paper I utilize the case study of Guatemala to analyze this convergence of development, security, and fear. It is a country in which security discourses, motivated by fears in the Global North, have long incorporated humanitarian and development aims. Because of this long-standing merger of security and development aims, I argue that develop-ment encounters in the contemporary era continue to be shaped by fear.[1]

The language of fear is a pivotal part of the security-development nexus. Unspecified fears in the Global North are portrayed as motivating factors for the augmentation of regional security and development initiatives. However, this language also serves to camouflage incentives for increased intervention such as power, profit, and control. Further, at the other end of the stakeholder spectrum, in Guatemala legacies of violence, surveillance, and coercion con-tinue to structure development encounters at the local level in profound ways. Development practitioners recognize this, yet their framing of fear's influence on development projects and processes focuses primarily on the discourse of a "culture of fear." The resultant programmatic emphases on social cohesion, sol-idarity, and behaviors which "better contribute" to both development and secu-rity work to mask the racialized elements of these discourses and obscure the practices through which lived experiences of fear are reproduced.

As security-development discourses continue apace, it is imperative to inter-rogate these ways in which security, development, and fear are knotted together in complex ways in policy, rhetoric, and practice. In this paper, after briefly reviewing the literature regarding security, development, and fear, I outline the methods utilized in this research and describe the case study setting. I then trace the deep lineage of the merger of security and development in Guatemala to set the context for analyzing the perspectives of development practitioners

regarding fear in postconflict communities. In the conclusion I reflect on the implications of the long-term twinning of security and development in Guatemala, as well as the contemporary contradictions found within development discourse and practice in the country.

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

DEVELOPMENT

Critical development theorists, many drawing from postcolonial, poststructural, and feminist perspectives, have usefully directed our gazes to the problematic linear notion of progress that underlies many mainstream approaches to development (Ferguson 1990; Parpart 1993; Escobar 1995; T. Mitchell 2002; Wainwright 2008; to name a few). Arguing against universalist approaches focused on national economic growth, they emphasize the multipronged mechanisms and outcomes of development at and across various scales. The unequal power relations that characterize many development interventions are central to these critiques. In particular, many critiques apply Foucault's idea of discourse to unpack the power dynamics imbricated in development projects and processes (Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995; Gupta 2001; T. Mitchell 2002; Li 2007; among others). As discourses surrounding development are elevated to the level of universal truth, they also become a means through which actors and subjects learn to think about and understand the "problems" of the world in which they live, as well as the solutions to those problems. In tandem with this, critical development scholars also draw from Foucault's ideas of biopolitics and governmentality to understand the longstanding logics of and processes through which the state exercises power over the body/ies of its population. Governmentality, which is often shorthanded to "the conduct of conduct," entails the modification of human behaviors "by calculated means" (Li 2007, 5).

These means include the (often, though not always, subtle) conditioning through which individuals are taught to govern themselves. The biopolitical element of this are those actions that are primarily concerned with the administration of the life and bodies of the population. Drawing together the biopolitics and disciplinary mechanisms (that is, Foucault's broader notion of biopower) of governance is most evident in development projects that incorporate behavior regulation, such as hygiene projects or population control programs. However, the "will to improve" through self-change (Li 2007, 5), remains a through-line in development thinking and planning. Further, as development knowledge is constructed, replicated, elevated to the level of common-sense "truth," and ultimately internalized, the mechanisms of its construction are glossed over.

THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

While terminology has shifted, the concepts of "development" and "security" have long been intertwined (Abrahamson 2005; Duffield 2007; Stern and

Öjendal 2010). From colonial era civilizing missions to Cold War fears, multiple actors have deployed development as a mechanism to prevent revolt and ensure stability. As Mark Duffield argues, "[t]he benevolence with which development cloaks itself…conceals a stubborn will to manage and contain disorder rather than resolve it" (2007, viii). However, as Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal note, the idea of the "nexus," with an "explicit articulation of the connections between the two" is a more recent occurrence (2010, 10).

One iteration of the nexus is the "human security" paradigm of development, which emerged in the 1990s. This paradigm extended security beyond geopolitical conceptualizations and emphasized the "security of people rather than states" (Duffield 2007, 111). In the post–Cold War era, security agendas increasingly embraced nonmilitary aspects (Abrahamson 2005). The contemporary security-development nexus has resulted in "a new willingness to countenance a level of intrusion and degree of social engineering hitherto frowned upon by the international community" (Duffield 2002, 1050). Activities housed under the security-development nexus have become ever-expansive, including everything from poverty reduction, gender awareness, and human rights (Duffield 2002). These shifts can be seen in Guatemala to some extent. Yet, as I outline in this paper, the deployment of biopolitical tools that work to entwine development and security in the country have long been expansive, intrusive, and sometimes violent.

However, what is notable in the current security-development nexus, is the renewed emphasis on viewing poverty in the Global South as a security concern for those in the Global North (Duffield 2002; Abrahamson 2005; O'Gorman 2011). This shift works to "draw attention away from the West's contribution to the problems of underdevelopment" (Abrahamson 2005, 74). Envisioning the Global South as the source of insecurity, created by poverty—for which it is also responsible—displaces both the Global North's responsibility for, and contribution to, these very issues.

FEAR AND THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Fear plays an important—yet often understudied—role in the security-development nexus. As Jennifer Hyndman notes, "[c]oncerns about survival, security, and sovereignty are intimately linked to the production of fear at multiple scales" (2007, 367). And as Rita Abrahamson argues, "Development has always been motivated, at least in part, by fear and has aimed to pacify danger through shaping and modifying behavior in accordance with accepted norms of modernity and civilization" (2005, 75). While the contemporary security-development paradigm has resulted in new scholarly concern regarding the ways in which "fear and crisis" are produced and "used creatively and strategically to justify violence and exclusion" at the global level (Hyndman 2007, 369), in Latin America fear has long been the subject of academic interest.

Scholars have analyzed the legacies of fear produced through violence and conflict in Latin America (Scheper-Hughes 1993; Green 1999; Kruijt and

Koonings 1999; Torres Rivas 1999; McIlwaine and Moser 2007). Many note how fear negatively impacts solidarity or the "social fabric" of a community (Torres Rivas, 1999; Koonings and Kruijt, 2004; McIlwaine and Moser 2007), resulting in what are frequently described as "cultures of fear" or "societies of fear." However, this conceptualization is troublesome in its erasure of agency. Jane Margold contends that these approaches diminish the role of individual agency (1999). She compels us to examine the specificities of the causes and effects of fear in societies without equating fear to a cultural norm.

Not unlike the superorganic approach to culture in some variants of cultural geography (as critiqued by James Duncan (1980), Don Mitchell (1995), among others), the approach to fear in many "culture of fear" theses conceptualizes people as passive elements in such cultures. The interactions, conflicts, and everyday practices which reproduce the lived experience of fear are often absent. As Rachel Pain and Susan J. Smith argue, "[f]ear does not pop out of the heavens. . .it has to be lived and made" (2008, 2). The reification of fear in the representations of cultures of fear in Latin America turns fear into an abstraction, erasing the actions and motivations of individuals from the equation.

While not detracting from the influential power of fear, in this paper, I argue it is also important to question who has the power to articulate whose fear. How do dominant narratives of fear shape the "way forward" as development actors and community members reconcile fear? Perhaps most importantly, can incongruities among various perspectives on fear in fact serve to perpetuate, rather than reconcile, fear?

Methods and Case Study Setting

In this paper I draw from my broader research on the relationship between development and fear in an indigenous municipality in the western highland region of Guatemala. Estimates related to the percentage of indigenous inhabitants in the country vary, although several agree that approximately 50 percent of the country's 16 million people are indigenous. Also recognized is that economic growth in the country has not translated into poverty reduction (IDB 2016). Rather, poverty rates have increased in the past ten years, particularly affecting the indigenous population, which faces a poverty rate of 79.2 percent (IDB 2016). As a country with one of the highest inequality rates in Latin America (World Bank 2018), Guatemala presents an interesting case study in which to interrogate the intersection of the seemingly intractable issues of poverty against the onslaught of continual and longstanding development interventions at multiple levels.

The primary fieldwork and interviews from which this paper draws occurred over a twelve-month period in 2010, with briefer follow-up visits in 2011 and 2014. I conducted participant observation in a K'iche' municipality in the western highlands and held semistructured interviews with a range of development practitioners. As part of my participant observation, I tagged along

with community members to a whole host of activities which fell under the general umbrella of "development" or *proyecto* (project). These included activities such as workshops (covering things like nutrition, leadership, AIDS awareness, and hygiene), medical clinic visits, reforestation projects, microcredit loan repayment meetings, and child sponsorship activities (including meetings to write letters to sponsors and benefit distribution events). The semistructured interviews were with representatives from twenty-eight NGOs (local, national, and international), six Guatemalan government officials, and twelve representatives from the international donor community (from multilateral institutions as well as foreign government aid organizations).[2] I also examined contemporary and archival texts, including newspapers, NGO publications, and government publications.

Residents I spoke with, as well as development stakeholders from all perspectives, concurred that fear is a serious consideration for development initiatives in contemporary Guatemala. Several themes emerged in my research, particularly in regards to the causes of fear as it relates to development, including the civil war, contemporary crime and violence, and the collection of information. Respondents described these various, interrelated factors as being a *caldo de cultivo* (breeding ground) of fear in the country. I found a key element underlying the caldo de cultivo was the long-term linkage between security and development discourses in the country.

As such, in the following section I trace how development and security have been forged together in Guatemala. Furthermore, based on my conversations and participant observation during my fieldwork, the common responses to my questions about fear and development centered on the overarching fears regarding the collection of information and surveillance. Using these responses as a guide, I then highlight the responses and perceptions of development practitioners regarding the relationship between development and fear in the country in order to interrogate dissonance not only within their responses, but also in juxtaposition with community concerns. In particular, I argue that common references to "broken communities" or "torn social fabrics" are suggestive of fear's multidimensional role in structuring development encounters (Howard, Hume and Oslender 2007; Radcliffe 2007; Clouser 2014).

ENDURANCE OF THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN GUATEMALA

Often expressed as "civilizing missions," the ties between development and security in Guatemala have their roots in the colonial and neocolonial eras (Martínez Salazar 2012). Later, during the Cold War, initiatives were framed with the familiar refrain of "winning the hearts and minds" of citizens to prevent the emergence of "another Cuba" (Streeter 2006, 65). The context of this was the Guatemalan civil war, which began in the 1960s, as guerilla movements began battling military government forces. Around the same time, the U.S. launched a ten-year development plan for Latin America, known as the Alliance for Progress. In addition to

infrastructure and literacy projects, the plan provided counterinsurgency training and subsidized armies and police forces (Holden 1993; Streeter 2006). And, ultimately, these latter security components became its main focus (Coatsworth 1994; Park 1995). As the Alliance for Progress came to a close in the early 1970s, the goals of "modernizing" Latin America had not been met. As Robert Holden argues the "only long-lasting result was the modernization of violence" (1993, 311) along with the solidification of the military's role in planning and implementing national development (Barry 1986).

When the Guatemalan civil war violence intensified in the late 1970s and early 1980s (during the regimes of Lucas Garcia and Ríos Montt), the military amplified its role in development planning. In 1982, Ríos Montt approved a National Plan of Security and Development (PNSD), which combined military force with civic action development schemes, in a project known as "Beans and Rifles" (*Frijoles y Fusiles*). In tandem with the violence (*fusiles*), the plan included the provision of shelter and food aid (*frijoles*) for the displaced indigenous survivors. The army implemented a "model village program," which purportedly offered opportunities for economic development, but which served as a form of surveillance and control of resettled populations (Americas Watch Committee 1986; Schirmer 1998). Survivors were required to pass through "re-education" programs, aimed at integrating the "primitive" indigenous population into the "national fabric" (USAID officials, as cited in Streeter 2006, 59). This explicit fusing of development, national security, and behavior modification remained prominent throughout the civil war.

While Guatemala ostensibly returned to civilian rule in 1986, the military retained control over the countryside through its dominance over development programs (CEH 1999; McCleary 1999). By the time the Peace Accords were signed in 1996, approximately 200,000 people had been killed or disappeared and 600 indigenous villages had been destroyed. The subsequent truth commission attributed 93 percent of atrocities to the military and found that 83 percent of the victims were indigenous (CEH 1999). While not completely absent from development discourse in the years after the signing of the accords, security narratives were downplayed as initiatives focused more on reconstruction, implementation of the accords, and empowering civil society (Howell and Pearce 2001; Oglesby 2007).

As crime and violence spiked in the postaccords era, however, the language of security returned to the development discourse. This was particularly noticeable in the political campaign for the 2011 election. The eventual winner, retired military general Otto Pérez Molina, was the first military figure to hold the position of president in Guatemala since the civil war. His campaign featured a *mano dura* (firm hand or iron fist) approach to crime, with promises on billboards declaring, "no more poverty, no more insecurity, with a mano dura it can be done!" The use of the military in a law enforcement capacity increased under the Pérez Molina regime, with 2500 soldiers deployed to work in public

security roles in 2013 alone, raising concerns related to remilitarization in the country (MAWG 2013; NISGUA 2014).

In 2015, public protests against government corruption resulted in the resignation and jailing of Pérez Molina. Although his successor, Jimmy Morales, was not from the military, his party, the National Convergence Front (FCN), was founded by retired military officers. This provoked concerns regarding the influence of the military on Morales' administration. In 2017, however, the military began removing soldiers from law enforcement activities. Yet, rather than representing demilitarization, the soldiers were redeployed to "strategic" locations such as the borders and to oversee internal waterways (Barrientos and Pocón 2018). These relocations, in tandem with the ongoing deployment of soldiers in response to protests regarding megadevelopment projects (including those involving internal waterways associated with hydroelectric dam projects), signaled the on-going commitment of the army towards maintaining private sector interests, couched in the language of security and development. Further, the army's involvement in other development activities is now at a level unseen since the civil war (Contreras 2017). It plays a key role in what the Morales administration has dubbed "the Development Train." The army is described as "driving" the development train through civic action endeavors, including road and bridge construction, making desks and wheel chairs, and participating in vaccination campaigns (Espina 2016; Cardona 2017; Contreras 2017).

Concerns have also been raised regarding regional development initiatives, primarily the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity. It was developed in 2014 by the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, in conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and with the support of the United States. The regional leaders rolled out the plan in response to migration issues and it was the focus of "The Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America" described in the introduction of this paper. Issues such as drug trafficking, transnational criminal organizations, and gangs are highlighted as key elements of insecurity and violence and are seen as drivers of migration, in tandem with poverty. In response, the plan emphasizes funding security programs, attracting foreign investment to the region, facilitating trade, improving infrastructure, and integrating economies. However, the continued security focus with a reinvigorated military component, as evidenced by holding a portion of the event on a U.S. military base, was met with backlash from human rights organizations (Beltrán, 2017; LAWG 2017).

In addition to remilitarization, critics highlight the plan's combined emphases on private investment and energy expansion, which are linked to hydroelectric projects, mining, and biofuel production (including African palm oil plantations). These activities are intimately tied to ongoing land conflicts and violent dispossession in Guatemala and are often met with organized resistance at the local level (Abbott 2017; Ponsford 2017). The military, along with the police, carry out evictions, which are growing more frequent and

increasingly violent (CIDH 2017; Grandin 2017). In May and June 2018 violence against activists associated with resisting evictions and megaproject expansion spiked, with seven activists assassinated in the span of one month, drawing international attention (Amnesty International 2018; Cultural Survival 2018). While current development and security narratives seem to emphasize underlying factors and systemic issues, the resulting initiatives remain primarily focused on narrowly conceived issues of development and security. Militarization and foreign investment are not new solutions, but replicate past policies. As such, these strategies are unlikely to improve the livelihoods of many Guatemalans— but rather may increase violence, instability, and fear at the local level.

Development Practitioner Dissonance: Surveilling the Broken Community

For many in Guatemala, fear is not solely a product of historical legacies, but rather an evolving and persistent reality. In this vein, the civil war is not in the distant past, but rather is an ongoing part of the contemporary lives of Guatemalans. As a representative from a multilateral organization noted, "the impact of the armed conflict has not yet been overcome in this generation...It is still very fresh." The problematic coexistence of "fresh" civil war memories, the enduring linkages between development and security, and the increased use of the military in development (as both a practitioner and protection agent of large-scale projects), presents a complicated framework within which community members interpret intentions, motivations, and goals of various "assistance" initiatives and development agendas. In particular, the strategies, languages, and geographies of past and present development initiatives—while perhaps evolving somewhat—display a high degree of consistency throughout the years.

Development practitioners recognize many of the issues that arise given the complex legacies of conflict, violence, and marginalization that have occurred in the country, particularly in regards to indigenous communities. However, in my interviews I found various points of disjuncture between the general perceptions of development practitioners and my findings in conversations with project beneficiaries. These revolved around the notions of 'broken communities" or a "torn social fabric." In many postconflict societies, programs emphasize enriching empowerment and strengthening solidarity. While these are important considerations, in many cases such projects present an incomplete understanding of the situation in recipient communities. For example, as one NGO representative summarized, "what I think is that...[the fear] is a little less in relation to 'they can kill me en masse,' .... But I believe that people will never return to the way it was...Unfortunately, the community is broken."

This notion of a "broken" community was a common theme throughout my interviews with development actors. Respondents described how fears stemming from legacies of violence have generated a reluctance to participate and an overall

lack of community investment in development projects. On one hand, the above response recognizes that emotions are not static. As past and contemporary experiences recombine, development actors attempt to articulate what they perceive to be the evolving nature of fear in communities. However, the idea of a broken community or a torn social fabric is conceptualized as being solely based on a historic legacy—rather than as something which is continually remade and reinforced through contemporary interactions, experiences, and perceptions.

Development practitioners also expressed their frustrations, lamenting that fear has led to a lack of long-term vision, an inability to make decisions, or diminished creativity among project beneficiaries. One international NGO representative linked this to a "culture of victimization," noting, "When we stay within this culture of victimization, we don't have proactive people, people with new goals, people who have dreams…They don't have imagination or creativity in order to know how to utilize what they have." A respondent from a government agency echoed a similar sentiment:

> For over five hundred years, the people have had an imagination that, well, they have been repressed. They have had little participation and they do not make their own decisions. So, when organizations arrive, NGOs arrive, [the national government] arrives – everyone arrives with good intentions. The people will simply accept it. They accept what you give, but they mistrust whether or not it is good or whether or not it might bring with it other consequences.

And as another international NGO representative described, "Their view is very limited…when we arrive with them and we ask that they generate some new ideas…it is very difficult. There is almost the necessity of bringing them the ideas, you know?" While framed as a consequence of legacies of violence, what is notable in these responses is the paternalism and racism that have served to infantilize indigenous populations, validating the imposition of pre-configured development solutions. These impulses are reflected in development efforts, which often fall under the banner of "empowerment," that work towards training community members to more appropriately understand and participate in development. Although the language and framing are less overt, the overall impetus of teaching indigenous populations to better participate in national development is strikingly similar to the military re-education campaigns of the civil war.

This is not to argue that development practitioners and projects are inherently ill-intentioned. Rather, it highlights how fear structures development encounters in ways that are not always straightforward or obvious. For example, violent dispossession and expropriation have gone hand-in-glove with large-scale extractivist models of development for centuries. However, the more subtle, conditioning, and normalizing elements of other development projects, as wide ranging as hygiene workshops to tree planting, are also encased within the unequal power dynamics that characterize Guatemala's status quo.

Moreover, while development actors are frustrated that community members only invest the minimal amount of participation needed to receive the benefits of various initiatives, from the perspective of the community members, programs often fail to deliver concrete, tangible results. As one resident noted, "people come and take our information and then they don't come through with anything. It is all lies." And as another explained, "these organizations—well, they are deceptive, you know? They say they will give you things, and then they don't give them." Residents do not unquestioningly accept the premises and promises of development. Rather, community members have learned through their experiences that "development" does not always bring with it desired ends.

In addition, fear does not produce a universal, powerless, or impotent response. Responses range from a combined form of resilience, resistance, accommodation, anger, and avoidance. Such responses are as multiple as the range of actions and activities that fall under the banner of development. For example, resistance to megaprojects can be seen much more prominently in community protests (just as the megaprojects themselves are much more visible). However, responses to projects with less visibility, including empowerment workshops that attempt to "motivate" participation through the imposition of conditions on the receipt of tangible benefits, may superficially generate participation, but their impacts on reinforcing community fears run much deeper. Yet, when approached from a "culture of fear" perspective, practitioners translate and represent these complex responses as passivity. Experiences have demonstrated the potentially punitive impacts of interventions that arrive under the guise of development, as well as the disappointing outcomes of a variety of development promises. In this way, these responses can be interpreted as agency, rather than as a "weakness" in the social fabric. Yet, the language of a culture of fear dismisses such agency. Further, culture of fear perspectives obscure the concrete practices and mechanisms, like the collection of information, which reproduce and reinforce fear in the contemporary era.

While discussing fears related to various activities, participants questioned the extensive collection of personal information and wondered what their ultimate "payment" would be (related to anything from a monetary payment, a political commitment, or—in some cases—the fear of someone coming to claim their children). Comprehensive, often very personal, surveys are a standard component of nearly all development programs and activities in the municipality. Local residents often mentioned the collection of information as one of their greatest fears related to development initiatives. And development actors relayed stories regarding confrontations with communities in their attempts to collect information.

At first glance, it may be surprising that the seemingly mundane, bureaucratic processes of registration and surveys would be among the most widely cited causes of fear related to development projects. However, experiences have

demonstrated the harm that can come from the collection of information, engendering a preference among residents to remain "illegible" (Scott 1998) to the government or other actors. As an international NGO representative described:

> When we do a training, or we have some type of activity, we are interested in having a registration of who is participating, and more than anything a signature or a fingerprint. And people will not do this very spontaneously. They always ask what it will be used for and why the list is necessary. And there are communities that in the face of doubt, prefer to not sign anything...They relate external groups and the interventions in the communities as tied to information [going] to the government or to control.

Underlying these issues is how the collection of information can also be conceptualized as surveillance. Certain aspects of development projects further underscore these ties between the collection of information, surveillance, and behavior modification. This is most notable in regards to Guatemala's state-sponsored conditional cash-transfer program, which provides money to impoverished families in exchange for meeting conditions such as school attendance and visiting health clinics. Critics of conditional cash-transfer programs question the sustainability and effectiveness of such programs, as they fail to address structural challenges such as land tenure (Gaia 2010; Standing 2011). Rather, the emphasis on behavioral change frames the causes of poverty as "[stemming] from character deficiency, 'persistent misguidedness,' ignorance or laziness" (Standing 2011, 28).

One multilateral respondent provided an example of the contradictory elements arising from the disjuncture between the desire of project beneficiaries to retain anonymity and record keeping:

> ...there was a tremendous fear in the indigenous community to give their identity numbers. This was one of the problems in setting up [the conditional cash transfer system] – people were reluctant to meet with the interviewers because they had to give their identity number...This is related to the genocide in the 1980s...People were exterminated. And one way of keeping track of people then was by their identity numbers. So people now do not want others to know who they are or where they are.

As the above quote alludes, many concerns regarding the collection of information stem from civil war-era experiences of surveillance and of having one's name on "a list" (either marked for death or torture as a suspected subversive, or for potential forced recruitment by the military). However, as a respondent from an international NGO reflected, the source of such fears runs much deeper:

> I feel that this is in the collective memory...It is like how we internalized the colonization, the discrimination, and all of the processes of racism...They are internalized. All of that fear...and keeping silent...You do not know what they will use your information for. That is what people carry with them.

Nevertheless, many organizations have adopted techniques that are similar to the conditional cash-transfer model, tying the receipt of a benefit (such as rice, sugar, or cooking oil) to conditions (for example, workshop attendance, school attendance, health clinic visits). Some development actors conceptualize this as a motivation to participate in projects. As a national NGO representative explained, "there is kind of a constant, I would say more support, instead of monitoring, but the monitoring takes place through the delivery of services." While the fear in these instances is no longer that of violence or death, the coercive nature underpinning interactions premised on obligatory behavior modification reflects a continuity in development thinking and practice that reached its pinnacle during the civil war.

Residents work to subvert these forms of control by not complying with demands to provide information or by providing misinformation. One government representative, who had arrived in the community near dusk demanding assistance in delivering food aid, expressed his frustration at the lack of compliance in locating the families on his list, "no one will tell me where [the families] live. They say they don't know!" The health promoter he sought out for assistance explained, "it is part of the custom here—people are afraid to tell you anything, especially where other people live." At this, she retrieved her own spreadsheets of names and addresses, and proceeded to guide him directly to each of the families. The collection of information is representative of how everyday, seemingly innocuous development encounters can simultaneously shape and be shaped by fears. Such subtle encounters are perhaps the most insidious, as they are often overlooked or unnoticed as potential causes of fear.

Conclusions and Implications

The implications of this dissonance between development discourses and practices are multiple. At one level, fear—as it relates to development—continues to be reinforced and reproduced. However, this should not be read as an attempt to isolate fear as a singular factor, working independently of other emotions, structures, or power dynamics. Rather, I aim to problematize contemporary development thinking regarding postconflict approaches towards solidarity, empowerment, and reconciliation by pointing out major points of disjuncture. Current approaches to development (including the collection of information from communities, the monitoring of programs, and the involvement of the military) can also work towards further perpetuating fear within the communities.

Many think about fear related to development in association with more prominent interventions, which involve violent dispossession and marginalization. And, indeed, these approaches to development do produce violence and fear rather than improvements in livelihoods for the majority of the population. However, the structural role of fear is not always so overt. The conceptualization of a torn social fabric with its resultant lack of participation and

vision in communities isolates fear as a historical—rather than an ongoing—factor of initiatives. Many of the contradictions that then emerge as development practitioners face frustration in attempting to generate community participation and investment in programs, are a result of the ways in which development initiatives, in and of themselves, continue to reinforce community fears. Tying together the receipt of particular benefits in exchange for mandatory health clinic visits, workshop participation, or extensive surveys, mimic the counterinsurgency strategies of surveillance, monitoring, and behavior modification. Rather than working as empowering devices that build solidarity, participants regard such projects with suspicion as surveillance and monitoring devices, reflecting the enduring linkages between fear, surveillance, and development in the country.

Development practitioners recognize this deep embeddedness of fear in the development apparatus of Guatemala. However, their framing of fear's influence on development projects and processes in the country works to silence and delegitimize indigenous demands for structural change. Portraying communities as "broken," victimized, or unimaginative not only undermines community agency but also obscures the concrete practices through which fear is reproduced.

At a broader level, the securitization of development further entrenches inequalities through its prioritization of fears in the Global North. While such northern fears remain unspecified, they become a legitimizing tool for advancing external agendas This is perhaps most directly visible in the frequent coupling of military interventions and development, promoted with U.S.-based slogans such as "their success is our security." Direct military involvement in development projects ranges from biopolitical medical clinics and behavior modification projects to land evictions and conflicts surrounding megadevelopment projects in the country. These power dynamics, which are knotted together in discursive and material ways throughout multiple, overlapping scales, can result in intensified poverty, violence and discrimination. Recognition of this is imperative, as contemporary development and security narratives continue to double-down on well-worn security-development strategies.

NOTES

[1] I use the phrase "development encounter" to describe the myriad engagements between a variety of stakeholders (including practitioners, policymakers, donors, and local community members) involved in the diverse projects and processes housed under the rubric of "development."

[2] In an effort to maintain anonymity, I do not name precise locations, organizations, or individuals in this paper.

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